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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between time preferences, economic incentives,
and body mass index (BMI). Using data from the 2006 National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth, we rst show that greater impatience increases BMI and the likelihood of obe-
sity even after controlling for demographic, human capital, occupational, and nancial
characteristics as well as risk preference. Next, we provide evidence of an interaction
e¤ect between time preference and food prices, with cheaper food leading to the largest
weight gains among those exhibiting the most impatience. The interaction of chang-
ing economic incentives with heterogeneous discounting may help explain why increases
in BMI have been concentrated amongst the right tail of the distribution, where the
health consequences are especially severe. Lastly, we model time-inconsistent pref-
erences by computing individualsquasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters ( and ).
Both long-run patience () and present-bias () predict BMI, suggesting obesity is partly
attributable to rational intertemporal tradeo¤s but also partly to time inconsistency.
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1 Introduction
Obesity, dened as having a body mass index (BMI) of at least 30, has become a leading
public health concern in the developed world in recent decades.1 The most dramatic rise has
occurred in the Unied States (US), where the obesity rate skyrocketed from 13% in 1960 to
34% in 2006 (Flegal et al., 1998; National Center of Health Statistics, 2008). Adverse health
conditions attributed to obesity which include heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure,
and stroke lead to an estimated 112,000 deaths per year in the US (Sturm, 2002; Flegal et al.,
2005). Treating obesity-related conditions costs the US an estimated $117 billion annually,
with about half of these expenditures nanced by Medicare and Medicaid (US Department of
Health and Human Services, 2001; Finkelstein et al., 2003). As shown in Figure 1, the rise
in obesity has resulted from both increases in the mean and variance of BMI, as the largest
weight gains have been concentrated amongst the right tail of the BMI distribution.
A large literature attempts to characterize the rise in obesity as an economic phenom-
enon driven by changes in economic incentives. Particular attention has been paid to the
lower monetary and time costs of food consumption resulting from falling food prices and
increasing restaurant density.2 Such aggregate-level variables might help explain the growth
in average BMI, but they cannot explain the increasing variance unless some people respond
more strongly to changing economic incentives than others. This paper argues that such het-
erogeneity is partly attributable to di¤erences in individualstime preferences. We provide
a theoretical and empirical investigation of the interplay between time preferences and food
prices, nding that impatience both increases BMI and strengthens ones response to food
1BMI = weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.
2For examples of papers studying the inuence of food prices on BMI, see Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002),
Philipson and Posner (2003), Chou et al. (2004), Lakdawalla et al. (2005), and Goldman et al. (2010). For
examples of papers studying the role of restaurants, see Chou et al. (2004), Rashad et al. (2006), Dunn
(2008), Currie et al. (2010), and Anderson and Matsa (forthcoming). Other economic factors linked to
obesity include time costs of food preparation (Cutler et al., 2003), on-the-job physical activity (Philipson and
Posner, 2003; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002), work hours (Courtemanche, 2009b), cigarette prices (Chou
et al., 2004; Gruber and Frakes, 2006; Baum, 2008; Nonnemaker et al., 2008; Courtemanche, 2009), gasoline
prices (Courtemanche, 2011), Walmart Supercenters (Courtemanche and Carden, 2011), urban sprawl (Eid et
al., 2008; Zhao and Kaestner, 2010), and the unemployment rate (Ruhm, 2000 and 2005).
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prices. We also t a quasi-hyperbolic specication and provide evidence that these estimated
relationships are at least partly driven by time inconsistency.
A growing body of research examines the link between time preference and BMI.3 Komlos
et al. (2004), Smith et al. (2005), Borghans and Golsteyn (2006), and Zhang and Rashad
(2008) all document a connection between proxy variables for time preference and weight.4
More recent work utilizes direct measures of time preference elicited through questions on
intertemporal trade-o¤s. These include small-sample laboratory studies of adults in the
Boston area (Chabris et al., 2008), college students in Birmingham, AL (Weller et al., 2008),
and children in Austria (Sutter et al., 2010), as well as larger-sample surveys of Japanese
adults (Ikeda et al., 2010), Dutch adults (Van der Pol, 2011), and US children (Seeyave et al.,
2009).5
While important progress has been made in understanding the time preference-BMI rela-
tionship, three important questions remain unanswered. First, does the association represent
a ceteris paribus impact of time preference on BMI or merely a spurious correlation? Omitted
variable bias could result from associations between impatience and potential determinants
of BMI such as education, income, wealth, work hours, occupation, and risk preference. Of
3A related literature examines the link between risk preference and BMI; see, for instance, Anderson and
Mellor (2008).
4Komlos et al. (2004) illustrate a time-series relationship between obesity and both the savings rate
and debt-to-income ratio in the US, and also show that developed countries with low savings rates have
higher obesity rates. Smith et al. (2005) conduct an individual-level analysis with data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), nding some evidence of a connection between savings behavior and
BMI. Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) consider a number of proxies for time preference available in a Dutch
dataset and nd that the extent to which time preference and BMI are related depends heavily on the choice
of proxy. Zhang and Rashad (2008) estimate a link between time preference and BMI in two datasets, the
small Roper Center Obesity survey and the larger Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Their proxies
for time preference are self-reported willpower in the former and desire but no e¤ort to lose weight in the
latter.
5Chabris et al. (2008) nd a relationship between discount rate and BMI, as well as other health behaviors
such as smoking and exercise. Weller et. al. (2008) show that obese women exhibit greater discounting than
non-obese women. Sutter et. al. (2010) estimate a signicant correlation between time preferences and BMI,
along with alcohol and cigarette consumption. Seeyave et. al. (2009) nd that time preference measured at
age 4 is correlated with being overweight at age 11. Ikeda et al. (2010) estimate a connection between time
preference measured either by the discount rate or a proxy variable relating to debt and BMI . Van der
Pol (2011) examines the e¤ect of education on health outcomes, including BMI, when controlling for time
preference. Other papers look at the e¤ect of time preference on health outcomes besides BMI, e.g. smoking
and exercise (Song 2011), drinking and exercise (Chiteji 2010), disease screening (Bradford et. al. 2010),
behaviors to prevent hypertension (Axon et. al. 2009), or healthy behaviors in general (Bradford 2010).
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the aforementioned studies, only Zhang and Rashad (2008), Chabris et al. (2008), Ikeda et
al. (2010), and Van der Pol (2011) control for education; only Smith et al. (2005), Zhang and
Rashad (2008), Weller et. al. (2008), Seeyave et. al. (2009), and Ikeda et al. (2010) control
for income; only Ikeda et al. (2010) and Sutter et. al. (2010) control for work hours and
risk preference; and none control for wealth or occupation type. Reverse causality is another
possible concern, as obesity could reduce expected longevity and cause individuals to optimize
over a shorter time horizon.
The second question is whether time preference can help to explain the trend in BMI, as
opposed to merely the level. Meta-analyses and longitudinal studies have not found evidence
that rates of time preference have systematically changed over time.6 In the absence of such
changes, it is unclear how time preference could have played a role in the nearly three-fold
increase in the obesity rate over the past half-century.
A third open question is the extent to which the time preference-BMI connection is the
result of time-inconsistency as opposed to rational intertemporal substitution. If time-
inconsistent preferences are a cause of obesity, then there is a potential economic rationale
for policies designed to alter eating decisions (Cutler et al., 2003). The existing evidence
that quasi-hyperbolic discounting contributes to obesity is mostly circumstantial. Citing the
National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (2008), Ruhm (2010) notes
that over 200,000 Americans a year have bariatric surgery to reduce the size of their stomachs,
presumably as a commitment device to limit susceptibility to self-control problems. He also
documents the high prevalence of weight loss attempts, while showing that such attempts are
positively related to BMI. Dieting can be considered an admission of past mistakes, possibly
6In a meta-analysis of experimental and eld studies on time preferences published from 1978-2002, Percoco
and Nijkamp (2009) nd no evidence of changing time preferences over the sample period. Simpson and
Vuchinich (2000) demonstrate a high test-retest reliability for time preferences measured in lab experiments,
and Meier and Sprenger (2010) nd a similar high degree of stability for time preferences in a longitudinal eld
experiment. In both of these studies, the within-person stability of time preference was similar to those of
personality traits, suggesting that time preference is also a relatively xed factor over an individuals lifetime.
Further, Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) examine trends in some of their proxy variables for time preference
and nd no evidence that individuals have become systematically less patient.
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resulting from time inconsistency.7 He further describes biological reasons to expect time
inconsistency to be a factor in determining body weight. The human brain consists of both
a rational deliberative system and an a¤ective system driven by chemical reactions to stimuli.
The more the a¤ective system is in control, the further ones weight is likely to deviate from
her rational optimum.
We contribute to the literature on time preferences and BMI along all three of these fronts.
First, we push further than prior research toward establishing that the association between
time preference and BMI is in fact a ceteris paribus relationship. We do this by using the
2006 NLSY, which includes questions on body weight and hypothetical intertemporal trade-
o¤s along with a rich array of other individual information that enables the construction of
a detailed set of control variables. Building up from a simple regression to a model that
includes demographic characteristics, IQ, education, work hours, occupation type, income,
net worth, and risk preference, we show that greater impatience consistently increases BMI
and that the coe¢ cient estimate is stable once demographic characteristics and education are
added. The e¤ects are strongest for white males and are accompanied by related e¤ects on
the probabilities of being obese and severely obese. We also conduct falsication tests that
provide no evidence of a link between time preference and either height or health conditions
that are less directly tied to eating and exercise, further supporting a causal interpretation of
the results.
Our second contribution is to propose and test the theory that the magnitude of the e¤ect
of food prices on BMI varies with time preference. Intuitively, less-patient consumers care
relatively more about utility in the present. Food prices are a present cost, so as prices fall,
less-patient consumers respond with a larger increase in food consumption than do more-
7Schar¤ (2009) shows that the caloric consumption of obese individuals is less responsive to nutritional
information than that of other individuals, which he argues is evidence of hyperbolic discounting among the
obese. Ikeda et al. (2010) show that a proxy variable for procrastination inuences BMI but do not nd a
statistically signicant impact of their more direct measure of hyperbolic discounting a dummy variable for
whether the respondent discounted the future more heavily for a shorter delay than a longer delay. Royer et
al. (2011) document individuals voluntarily engaging in self-funded committment contracts to exercise, and
show that the e¤ects of these contracts were strongest for those who had previously struggled to maintain
regular exercise patterns.
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patient consumers. Matching the NLSY to local price data from the Council for Community
and Economic Research (C2ER), we show that the interaction of time preference and food
price is a statistically signicant predictor of BMI regardless of the control variables included
or the basket of goods used to construct the food price measure. The estimates imply that the
food price elasticity of BMI ranges from -0.23 for the least patient individuals to statistically
indistinguishable from 0 among the most patient. This interaction e¤ect can help explain
why increases in BMI have been concentrated in the right tail of the distribution as food has
become cheaper and more readily available. Although food prices have decreased roughly
uniformly for all consumers, their decrease has caused a larger increase in BMI for the least
patient consumers, individuals who already disproportionately comprised the right tail of the
BMI distribution. This heterogeneous response to decreasing food prices can explain trends
in BMI and obesity even if individuals have not become more impatient over time.
Finally, we provide a preliminary attempt to disentangle the relative contributions of
time inconsistency versus rational intertemporal substitution to these estimated relationships.
Using responses to the NLSYs intertemporal trade-o¤questions, we calculate each individuals
quasi-hyperbolic () discounting parameters, decomposing time preferences into a present
bias component  and a long-run component . We then re-run the previous BMI regressions
using these two discounting parameters, nding evidence that obesity is partly attributable
to both present bias and time-consistent impatience.8 Female BMI appears more strongly
driven by present-bias than time-consistent impatience, whereas the reverse is true for males.
The e¤ects of both components of time preference are stronger for whites than minorities.
We also interact  and  with the price of food and show that both present-bias and long-run
discounting strengthen price responsiveness, though only the interaction of  with food price
is consistently statistically signicant.
8In contrast to Ikeda et al. (2010), our approach accounts for not only whether individuals exhibit any
present-bias but also the degree of that bias, an important distinction given that almost 85% of our sample is
present-biased. The utilization of this additional information allows us to obtain clearer results.
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2 Theoretical Model
We begin by theoretically modeling the roles of time preference and food prices in determining
body weight. A consumer chooses food consumption (f), which provides instantaneous
consumption utility and a¤ects her future weight. Our simple model provides the intuition
behind the impact of prices and the discount factor on food consumption and weight. We
then briey discuss extending the model to analyze time-inconsistent preferences.
2.1 Two-Period Model with Time-Consistent Preferences
We rst consider a two-period model. The consumer receives an instantaneous utility from
food consumption in the rst period U(f) and pays a per-unit price of p. In the following
period, the consumers weight is a function of food consumption: w = g(f), where g is
increasing in f . The consumer receives a utility from her weight V (w). We assume that
the second-period utility is decreasing in weight, or that the consumer is at or over her ideal
weight, and that further weight gains are increasingly aversive.9 To simplify the notation,
dene V (f)  V (w) = V (g(f)). First-period utility is increasing and concave in food
consumption: U 0 > 0; U 00 < 0. Second-period utility is decreasing and concave in food
consumption: V 0 < 0; V 00 < 0. The discount factor applied between the two periods is .
The consumers full maximization problem is thus
max
f
U(f)  pf + V (f) (1)
The rst-order condition is
U 0(f)  p+ V 0(f) = 0 (2)
From an additional unit of consumption, the consumer receives a marginal benet from
instantaneous utility now, pays a marginal cost now, and su¤ers a marginal cost from weight
9This is a reasonable assumption for the vast majority of our sample, as only 0.8% are underweight
(BMI<18.5).
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in the future. We now show how the consumers weight depends on the price of food p, the
discount factor , and how the sensitivity to price varies with the discount factor.
Intuitively, a higher food price should lead to less food consumption and thus lower weight.
This can be veried by evaluating the derivative @w
@p
using the chain rule on w = g(f) and the
implicit function theorem on equation (2).
@w
@p
= g0(f) @f
@p
= g0(f) 1
U 00(f) + V 00(f)
< 0 (3)
The denominator is negative and g0 is positive. Higher food prices lead to less food consump-
tion and therefore lower weight.
Our second intuitive prediction is that more patient consumers should have lower weight,
because the disutility from being overweight occurs only in the future. We evaluate @w
@
in the
same manner as above
@w
@
= g0(f) @f
@
= g0(f)  V
0(f)
U 00(f) + V 00(f)
< 0 (4)
Again the denominator is negative and g0 is positive. The numerator  V 0(f) is positive,
since we assume the consumer is above her ideal weight and thus gets negative utility from
additional weight in the future. A higher discount factor indicates a more patient consumer
and leads to less food consumption and lower weight.
Our third intuitive prediction is that the least patient individuals should be the most
responsive to food prices. The total cost of food is the sum of the explicit monetary price,
paid in the current period, and the health cost, paid in the future period. Impatient people
are relatively more concerned with present costs, and therefore should be more responsive to
the monetary price, i.e. their @w
@p
should be higher in absolute value (more negative). Patient
peoplesresponse to food price changes are tempered by their recognition of the future health
costs. Mathematically, @
2w
@@p
> 0.
To calculate this cross-partial derivative, we evaluate the derivative of @w
@p
with respect to
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, taking care to observe that within that derivative (equation (3)), f is also a function of 
and the chain rule must be applied accordingly. The cross-partial derivative is
@2w
@@p
=
1
(U 00 + V 00)2


 g0  V 00   g00  V 0 + g0  V 0  U
000 + V 000
U 00 + V 00

(5)
where the arguments of the functions have been dropped for clarity. Our intuitive prediction
was that this derivative should be positive, but in fact its sign is ambiguous. The coe¢ cient
in front of the brackets is positive. The rst term in the brackets ( g0 V 00) is positive, and it
represents the direct intuitive e¤ect that we described above: less patient consumers care less
about the current price and therefore their weight responds less to the price. However, the two
remaining terms pick up indirect e¤ects, and these may be positive or negative. The second
term ( g00  V 0) is the same sign as g00, about which we make no assumptions. If g00  0,
so that food consumption increases weight either constantly or convexly, then this second
term is non-negative, consistent with our intuitive prediction. Lastly, the third term in the
brackets has the same sign as the numerator in the fraction, which involves third derivatives
of U and V . We make no assumptions about these third derivatives. If both are positive, as
would be the case under CRRA preferences, or if both are zero, as would be the case under
quadratic utility, then this term is non-negative and our intuition stands. However, there
are possible cases in which this second derivative may in fact be negative, contrary to our
intuition.10 We thus leave it to our empirical work to determine with more certainty the sign
of this cross-partial derivative. A similar theoretical result is found in a model of rational
addiction in Becker et. al. (1991, footnote 3). They derive conditions under which addicts
response to price is larger for those who discount more.
This cross-partial derivative can potentially help to explain a fact about recent growth in
consumersBMI. Real food prices have fallen, which may have contributed to the growth in
average BMI (equation (3)). But prices have fallen roughly uniformly for all consumers, yet
10By making assumptions about functional forms and parameter values we are able to numerically nd some
cases where this second derivative is in fact negative, though it is positive in most cases.
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the growth in BMI is not uniform; it is concentrated in the right tail (Figure 1). This can
be explained with two facts from our model. First, those initially among the right of the
BMI distribution are likely those with lower discount factors (less patient), as predicted by
equation (4). Second, if the second derivative in equation (5) is positive, then these impatient
people will respond more strongly to the falling prices, and therefore the growth in BMI will
be right-skewed.
Although we will not directly test the theory that this helps to explain the right-skewed
growth in BMI, we test the predictions of equations (3) and (4), and we test for the sign
of equation (5). The empirical evidence supports both of our predictions and supports the
claim that the second derivative is positive, consistent with our explanation for the right-
skewed growth in BMI.
2.2 Three-Period Model with Time-Inconsistent Preferences
The two-period model provides the basic intuition and testable hypotheses regarding the in-
teraction between food prices, discount factors, and weight. It does not allow us to investigate
time-inconsistent preferences, so we next move to a three-period extension of the model that
allows for a consumer with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The long run discount factor is 
and the present-bias is . To keep the model as simple as possible, we consider only the
consumers decision over present food consumption f , and we allow that level of consumption
to a¤ect weight in both the second and third periods.11 Allow the consumers weight in the
second period to be given by the function g(f) and her weight in the third period h(f). The
reduced form instantaneous utility as a function of food consumption is V (f) in the second
period and W (f) in the third period. Assume again that the consumer is above her ideal
weight in all periods, so that V andW are both decreasing in f , and furthermore assume that
11A more complicated model that explicitly models the consumers second- and third-period consumption
decisions and their di¤erential e¤ects on weight in each period is available upon request from the authors, but
it does not provide any additional intuition beyond the simpler model here.
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V 00 and W 00 are both negative. The consumers rst-period maximization problem is
max
f
U(f)  pf + V (f) + 2W (f) (6)
and the rst-order condition is
U 0(f)  p+ V 0(f) + 2W 0(f) = 0 (7)
Here, the consumer receives an instantaneous benet from food consumption now, pays for
it now, and faces utility costs in the second and third periods. The implicit function theorem
can be used on this rst-order condition to nd the e¤ect of each discount factor on weight,
as well as the e¤ect of food price on weight:12
@w
@p
= g0(f) @f
@p
= g0(f) 1
U 00(f) + V 00(f) + 2W 00(f)
< 0 (8)
@w
@
= g0(f) @f
@
= g0(f)  V
0(f) + 2W 0(f)
U 00(f) + V 00(f)
< 0 (9)
@w
@
= g0(f) @f
@
= g0(f)  V
0(f) + 2W 0(f)
U 00(f) + V 00(f)
< 0 (10)
Food consumption and therefore weight decrease as the food price increases. As consumers
discount the future more over the long run (lower ), or as consumers become more present-
biased (lower ), food consumption and weight increase. As in the two-period model, these
intuitive rst-derivative results remain, whether patience is measured by the long-run discount
factor or by present bias.
As with the two-period model, the cross-partial derivative of weight with respect to either
 or  is theoretically ambiguous. Intuition suggests that as consumers become more present-
focused, either because of a lower  or because of a lower , they should respond more strongly
12These results refer to weight in the second period, g(f). The e¤ect of weight in the third period, h(f), is
found by replacing g with h in all the equations below, and is the same sign as the e¤ects presented.
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to price, but the expressions for both @
2w
@@p
and @
2w
@@p
contain a positive-denite term and other
terms with ambiguous sign. As before, we turn to empirical analysis to nd the sign of these
e¤ects.
3 Data
We test these intuitive and theoretical predictions using data from the NLSY, a panel from
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics that follows 12,686 individuals annually from 1979 to 1994
and then biennially through 2008.13 We restrict our analysis to the 2006 wave, as in that
year the survey included questions on hypothetical intertemporal trade-o¤s that allow for the
construction of our time preference measures. In 2006 only 6,592 individuals remained in the
panel, and after dropping observations with missing information our analysis sample is 5,982.
The respondents were between 14 and 22 years old at the start of the panel, so the age range
in the sample is 41 to 49.
Our main dependent variable is BMI, which we compute from self-reported weight and
height. We use weight from 2006 and height from 1985; the respondents were not asked
about height after 1985 as they were all adults by then. Following Cawley (1999) and others,
we adjust for measurement error in self-reported weight and height by exploiting the fact that
another national dataset, the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES),
includes both actual and self-reported measures. Using 41 to 49 year olds from the 2005-2006
NHANES, we predict actual weight and height as a quadratic function of self-reported weight
and height for each sex and race (white, black, or another race) subgroup. We then adjust
NLSY weights and heights accordingly and use the adjusted values to compute BMI. The
correlation between actual and self-reported BMI is very high, and the results are similar if
we do not employ the correction. We also use adjusted BMI to construct indicator variables
for whether the respondent is overweight (25  BMI < 30), Class I obese (30  BMI < 35),
13The 12,686 respondents consist of a random sample of 6,111 plus supplemental samples of 5,295 minority
and economically disadvantaged youths and 1,280 military youths. We employ the NLSYs sampling weights
throughout the analysis.
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or severely obese (BMI  35), with the omitted category reecting BMI < 25.
Our independent variables of interest are time preference measures computed from two
questions on hypothetical intertemporal trade-o¤s available in the 2006 NLSY survey.14 The
rst question is,
"Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim immediately. How-
ever, you have the alternative of waiting one year to claim the prize. If you do
wait, you will receive more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money
in addition to the $1000 you would have to receive one year from now to convince
you to wait rather than claim the prize now?"
We compute respondentsdiscount factors which we name "Discount Factor 1" (DF1)
from their answers (amount1) as follows:
DF1 =
1000
1000 + amount1
: (11)
The second question is,
"Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim immediately. How-
ever, you can choose to wait one month to claim the prize. If you do wait, you
will receive more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money in addition
to the $1000 you would have to receive one month from now to convince you to
wait rather than claim the prize now?"
We use these answers (amount2) to compute annualized discount factors (via exponential
annualization) named "Discount Factor 2" (DF2) through the following formula:
DF2 =

1000
1000 + amount2
12
: (12)
14DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) utilize the NLSY (and PSID) to explore the implications of impatience
for job search decisions. The authors construct a measure of impatience via factor analysis of several proxies
for impatience, such as smoking, life insurance, and contraceptive use. Cadena and Keys (2011) use NLSY
data to investigate the e¤ects of impatience on human capital formation. Their measure of impatience comes
from the survey interviewers assessment of the subject.
13
DF1 is our preferred measure of time preference since it is computed directly from the question
about an annual delay, and thus is not subject to the compounding of response error that the
annualized question based on monthly delay will be. The correlation between DF1 and DF2
is 0.57. We utilize DF2 as well as the average of DF1 and DF2 (denoted DF ) in some of
the robustness checks. Our conclusions are not sensitive to the use of discount rates instead
of factors.15
We exploit the fact that the 2006 NLSY contains two intertemporal discounting questions,
one over a monthly interval and the other over an annual interval, to compute a measure of
present-bias. A time-consistent individual should have the same (annualized) discount factor
over the monthly interval as the annual interval. By contrast, a present-biased individual will
display decreasing impatience and have a greater discount factor for the annual delay than
the monthly delay. We jointly t an individuals responses to both intertemporal questions
using the quasi-hyperbolic discounting specication, whereby individuals discount outcomes
 periods away at  : The parameter  reects an individuals "long-run" level of patience,
whereas  reects any disproportionate weight given to the immediate present at the expense
of all future periods (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997). If  = 1; then quasi-hyperbolic
discounting reduces to traditional, time-consistent discounting, whereas  < 1 reects time-
inconsistent present-bias. Assuming annual periods, an individuals joint responses to these
two questions imply that

1
12 =
1000
1000 + amount2
(13)
 =
1000
1000 + amount1
(14)
yielding  = (1000+amount2
1000+amount1
)
12
11 and  = 1000
(1000+amount1)
:
Some economists object that hypothetical questions, such as the ones above, provide no
incentive for respondents to carefully assess the intertemporal trade-o¤ and thus may not
15Note that the above discount factor computations implicitly assume linear utility.
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be representative of individualstrue preferences. However, at least in the domain of time
preferences, several studies have demonstrated no di¤erence in responses between real and
hypothetical decisions (Johnson and Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2003). Of studies demon-
strating a di¤erence between real versus hypothetical time discounting decisions, Kirby and
Marakovic (1995) found that subjects discounted real amounts more impatiently, whereas
Coller and Williams (1999) found that respondents discounted real amounts more patiently.
Taken together, these studies suggest that there is no systematic bias between the temporal
discounting of real versus hypothetical amounts.
We also utilize the answer to a 2006 NLSY question on risk preference as a control in order
to address the possible concern that time and risk preference are correlated. This question
is:
"Suppose you have been given an item that is either worth nothing or worth
$10,000. Tomorrow you will learn what it is worth. There is a 50-50 chance
it will be worth $10,000 and a 50-50 chance it will be worth nothing. You can
wait to nd out how much the item is worth, or you can sell it before its value is
determined. What is the lowest price that would lead you to sell the item now
rather than waiting to see what it is worth?"
Other information available in the NLSY allows us to construct a detailed set of control
variables. The demographic variables are age and dummies for gender, race, and marital
status. Percentile score on the Armed Forces Qualication Test (AFQT) proxies for intelli-
gence. We measure educational attainment with dummy variables for high school degree but
no college, some college but less than a four-year degree, and college degree or higher. The
omitted category is less than a high school degree. Hours worked per week and indicator
variables for white collar, blue collar, or service occupation (relative to the omitted category
of no paid work) reect labor market activity.16 Total household income and net worth, our
16We classify an individual as "white collar" if she reports an occupation of executive, administrative, and
managerial; management related; mathematical and computer scientists; engineers, architects, and surveyers;
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nancial controls, are computed by the NLSY based on respondentsanswers to a variety of
questions on income sources, assets, and liabilities. All control variables are from the 2006
survey except for the AFQT score and net worth, taken from the 1985 and 2004 surveys
respectively.
The NLSY also contains a health module administered to respondents the rst survey
after their 40th birthdays either 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, or 2006. Information on chronic
conditions allows for the construction of indicator variables for arthritis, asthma, anemia,
chronic kidney or bladder problems, chronic stomach problems, frequent colds, and frequent
headaches. These dummies serve as dependent variables in the falsication tests.
We match these individual-level data to local price information from the second quarter of
2006 taken from the C2ERs American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association Cost
of Living Index (ACCRA COLI). The second quarter 2006 ACCRA COLI computes prices
for a wide range of grocery, energy, transportation, housing, health care, and other items in
311 local markets throughout the US. Most of these local markets are single cities, but some
are multiple cities (i.e. Bloomington-Normal, IL) while others are entire counties (i.e. Dare
County, NC). We use the county identiers from the restricted version of the NLSY to match
each respondent to the closest ACCRA COLI market. This leads to measurement error in
the price variables that increases with distance from the nearest ACCRA COLI market. To
mitigate potential attenuation bias, in the regressions that include prices we drop the 892
respondents living in counties greater than 50 miles from the closest ACCRA COLI area,
reducing the sample size to 5,090. The conclusions reached are similar using 30, 40, 60, and
70 mile distance cuto¤s. Our food price variable is the average price of the 19 reported food
engineering and related technicians; physical scientists; social scientists and related; life, physical, and social
science technicians; counselors, social, and religious; lawyers, judges, and legal support; teachers; education,
training, and library; media and communications; health diagnosing and treating; health care technical and
support; sales and related; or o¢ ce and administrative support. We classify an individual as "blue collar" if
her occupation is entertainers and performers, sports and related; farming, shing, and forestry; construction
trade and extraction; installation, maintenance, and repairs; production and operating; setters, operators, and
tenders; transportation and material moving; military specic; or armed forces. We classify an individual as
"service" if her occupation is protective service; food preparation and serving related; cleaning and building
service; entertainment attendants and related; funeral related; personal care and service; sales and related;
o¢ ce and administrative support; or food preparation.
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items, weighted by their share as given by the ACCRA COLI. Table 1 lists these items while
giving their average prices and weights. We also construct a non-food price variable by taking
the weighted averages of the price indices for housing, utilities, transportation, health care,
and miscellaneous goods and services.
Tables 2 and 3 report the names, descriptions, means, and standard deviations of the vari-
ables used in the empirical analysis. The average BMI is 28.3; 38% of the sample is overweight
but not obese, 20% is class I obese, and 12% is severely obese. The mean discount factor is
0.6 using the annual delay question and 0.3 using the monthly delay question, corresponding
to a 66% and 257% annual interest rate. Though this degree of nancial impatience may
appear implausibly high, note that the NLSY questions explicitly establish receiving money
immediately as the status quo. A robust nding is that preferences are sticky towards a status
quo option, and measuring patience via this willingness to delay methodology yields greater
elicited impatience than methods which do not impose an immediate intertemporal reference
point (Loewenstein, 1988; Shelley, 1993; McAlvanah, 2010). The average respondent is more
patient over longer delays, supportive of hyperbolic discounting or diminishing impatience.
The quasi-hyperbolic specication implies that the average individual discounts any future
outcome with  equal to 0.80, and subsequent periods with discount factor of 0.75, or about
33% per year. The inclusion of  implies a more patient level of annual discounting than the
prior specications. 85% of individuals have  < 1, indicating that the vast majority of re-
spondents are present-biased. 7% of respondents reported perfect patience on both questions
and are therefore exactly time-consistent with  = 1. 8% of respondents are hyperopic and
future-biased with  > 1.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Discount Factor and BMI, Overweight, and Obesity
We begin the empirical analysis by estimating the association between discount factor and
BMI. Our main regression equation is
BMIi = 0+1DF1i+2DEMOi+3HCi+4LABORi+5FINi+6RISKi+"i (15)
where i indexes individuals. DF1 is the preferred annual discount factor measure described
in Section 3. DEMO is a set of demographic controls including age and indicators for gender,
race, and marital status. HC is a set of variables reecting endowment of and investment in
human capital; these include AFQT score and dummies for educational attainment. LABOR
is a set of controls for labor market activity, comprised of work hours and indicators for
whether an individuals employment is blue-collar, white-collar, or service industry, relative
to the omitted category of unemployment. FIN consists of the nancial controls income and
net worth, along with the square of income since prior research has documented an inverted
U-shaped relationship between income and BMI (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002). Finally,
RISK is the measure of risk preference. We include the sets of control variables in an
e¤ort to isolate the ceteris paribus relationship between time preference and BMI. If levels of
patience and BMI both di¤er systematically on the basis of age, gender, race, marital status,
intelligence, education, income, net worth, time spent working, or risk preference, failing to
adequately control for these variables may bias the estimators of 1. Our model contains
a more detailed set of covariates than the prior studies examining the relationship between
computed measures of time preference and BMI. Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) control for
only age and sex; Chabris et al. (2008) control for only age, sex, education, and depression
symptoms; and Ikeda et al. (2010) control for only age, gender, college degree, work hours,
18
smoking, and risk preference.17
Table 4 reports the results. We begin in column (1) with a simple regression of BMI on
discount factor and then gradually add the sets of controls to build up to the full model in
column (6). As robustness checks, in columns (7) and (8) we replace DF1 with DF2 and
DF , respectively. Discount factor is statistically signicant and negatively associated with
BMI in all eight regressions, suggesting that greater patience decreases weight. Including
the demographic and human capital controls in columns (2) and (3) attenuates the coe¢ cient
estimate for 1 somewhat, but across columns (3) to (6) the e¤ect stabilizes at -0.92 to -1.08
units. The results from columns (3) to (6) imply that a one standard deviation increase in
discount factor (0.25) decreases BMI by an average of 0.23 to 0.27 units, or 1.5 to 1.8 pounds
at the sample mean height of 67.55 inches. Columns (7) and (8) show that the results are
similar using the alternative discount factor measures. Though we are of course unable to
control for every potential confounding factor, the robustness of the link between discount
factor and BMI increases our condence that the relationship is causal rather than spurious.
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior research. Being
male, black, married, not having a college degree, having a lower net worth, and working longer
hours are associated with an increased BMI. Additional income is associated with a decrease
in BMI but at a diminishing rate. Individuals working at relatively physically demanding
blue collar and service jobs have lower BMIs than those working in white collar jobs or not
working (the omitted category), though the di¤erences are either statistically insignicant or
marginally signicant. Age, AFQT score, and risk preference are not statistically associated
with BMI conditional on time preference and the other regressors. The lack of an e¤ect for
age likely reects the limited age range in the sample.
17We do not control for smoking in any of our reported specications given its clear endogeneity. In
unreported regressions, we added a dummy for whether or not the individual smoked as of 1998 the last year
in which the NLSY included smoking questions and veried that the results remain similar. Less obvious
endogeneity problems could also exist for some of the variables we do include in the reported regressions,
such as education, work hours, income, and net worth. This highlights the importance of showing that the
estimated e¤ect of discount factor remains similar across a number of specications with di¤erent combinations
of control variables.
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Table 5 displays the estimates of 1 splitting the sample by gender and race, usingDF1 and
the full set of control variables. The e¤ect of discount factor on BMI is strong and signicant
for men, and still negative but smaller and insignicant for women. When stratifying by
race, discount factors impact is strong and signicant for whites but small and insignicant
for non-whites.18
We next estimate the association between discount factor and probability of being over-
weight, Class I obese, or severely obese using an ordered probit model. Since an increase
in BMI is not harmful to health throughout the entire distribution and actually improves
health at the far left tail, it is important to verify that weight gain caused by impatience is
accompanied by increased odds of becoming overweight or obese. We estimate
P (CATEGORYi = j) = (j   (0 + 1DF1i + 2DEMOi + 3HCi + (16)
4LABORi + 5FINi + 6RISKi + i))
where
CATEGORY =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 if BMI < 25
1 if 25  BMI < 30
2 if 30  BMI < 35
3 if BMI  35
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
and  is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution. Table 6
reports the estimate of 1 as well as the marginal e¤ects of discount factor on the probabilities
of being overweight, obese, or severely obese. Discount factor is statistically signicant at the
5% level and its coe¢ cient estimate is negative, indicating that greater patience is associated
with a lower BMI category. The marginal e¤ect of discount factor on P(Overweight) is small
and insignicant, indicating that the number of individuals transitioning from healthy weight
18The lack of a signicant e¤ect for non-whites should be interpreted with caution, as it could simply reect
the limited size of the subsample or heterogeneity within the subsample. To illustrate, the point estimates
for whites are within the 95% condence intervals for non-whites. In unreported regressions (available upon
request) we further stratied non-whites into subsamples of blacks, Hispanics, and others, but the sample sizes
were too small to obtain meaningful precision.
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to overweight are cancelled out by those transitioning from overweight to obese. The marginal
e¤ects of discount factor on P(Class I Obese) and P(Severely Obese) are -0.027 and -0.033
and are signicant at the 5% level. These e¤ects are sizeable relative to the sample Class I
obesity and severe obesity rates of 20% and 12%.
We close this section with a series of falsication tests. First, we re-estimate (15) using
height in inches instead of BMI as the dependent variable. Since it is implausible that
impatience a¤ects BMI by making people shorter rather than increasing their weight, such a
nding would call into question the validity of the identication strategy. We then utilize as
dependent variables chronic health conditions that are less directly the result of intertemporal
choices than BMI. These conditions include arthritis or rheumatism; asthma; kidney or
bladder problems; stomach, liver, intestinal, or gall bladder problems; anemia; frequent colds,
sinus problems, hay fever, or allergies; and frequent or severe headaches, dizziness, or fainting
spells. We also consider a dependent variable representing the total number of these conditions
reported. These health problems are less clearly tied to eating and exercise than obesity, so
any meaningful "e¤ect" of discount factor likely reects a mis-specied model rather than a
causal e¤ect. We estimate linear models for height, probit models for the individual health
conditions, and a Poisson model for the total number of conditions. Table 7 reports the
marginal e¤ects. Discount factor is never signicant at even the 10% level. These results
increase our condence that the ndings for BMI are not the artifact of omitted variables
correlated with patience and either health or stature. The falsication tests also help alleviate
concerns about reverse causality, as having a high BMI might decrease an individuals life
expectancy and thereby cause her to optimize over a shorter time horizon. If this were the
case, the measured discount factor should be correlated with all health problems regardless of
whether they are the direct result of behaviors.
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4.2 Interaction of Discount Factor and Food Prices
We next test the prediction that impatience strengthens the response to food prices by exam-
ining heterogeneity in the e¤ect of local food prices on BMI on the basis of discount factor.
Food prices are perhaps the most obvious economic incentive related to body weight, and the
decline in real food prices in recent decades is generally regarded as a contributing factor to
the rise in obesity (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002 and 2005; Philipson and Posner, 2003;
Chou et al., 2004; Goldman et al., 2010). Changing economic incentives such as falling food
prices may explain the increase in the mean of the BMI distribution, but do not explain why
the variance of the distribution has also increased. We hypothesize that changing incentives
have interacted with individualslevels of patience to both shift the BMI distribution to the
right and thicken its right tail. Testing for an e¤ect of the interaction of discount factor and
food prices provides a preliminary test of this theory.
The regression equation is similar to (15) but adds local food prices (PFOOD), non-food
prices (PNF ), and the interaction of food prices with discount factor:
BMIic = 0 + 1DF1ic +2DEMOic +3HCic +4LABORic +5FINic (17)
+6RISKic + 7PFOODc + 8(DF1i  PFOODc) + 9PNFc + "i
where c indexes counties.19 Controlling for non-food prices helps ensure that the estimated
e¤ect of food price is not simply capturing a more general price e¤ect. The endogeneity of
food prices is a natural concern. However, note that the regressor of interest in equation
(17) is the interaction of food price with discount factor, not food price itself. Even if
the coe¢ cient estimator for food price is biased by unobservable market-level factors a¤ecting
both food prices and weight, the estimator for the interaction term would only be biased if the
e¤ect of these unobservables di¤ers systematically for people with di¤erent discount factors.
It is not obvious why this would be the case. Further, the natural direction of the bias in
19In unreported regressions, we veried that the standard errors remain virtually identical clustering by
county.
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the estimator for food price is upward, as areas with high demand for food might have both
higher food prices and higher body weights. However, we still estimate an inverse relationship
between food prices and BMI, so any upward bias is not preventing us from obtaining the sign
predicted by economic theory.20
Table 8 displays the results in a similar format as Table 4, starting with a model with no
controls and gradually building up to the full specication in column (6). Columns (7) and
(8) again experiment with the alternative discount factor measures DF2 and DF . Table 9
contains additional robustness checks. One potential concern is that the food basket used
to compute market prices contains both healthful and unhealthful items, whereas the rise in
obesity may be the result of cheaper junk food rather than lower across-the-board food prices.
The rst two columns of Table 9 therefore experiment with dropping the (arguably) more
healthful items from the food basket in an attempt to isolate the price of unhealthful food.
The rst column excludes the fruits and vegetables (lettuce, bananas, potatoes, peas, peaches,
and corn). The second column also excludes the meats (steak, beef, chicken, sausage, eggs,
tuna, and chicken frozen dinner), leaving only white bread, cereal, potato chips, and the three
restaurant meals.21 The third through fth columns of Table 9 test for reverse causality
between BMI and food prices by controlling for future food price. The third column includes
the price of the original 19-item food basket in the second quarter of 2007, the fourth column
includes the price of this basket in the second quarter of 2008, and the fth column adds
both of these leads.22 If future food prices predict contemporaneous BMI conditional on
20In unreported regressions, we also attempted a panel data specication using the variation in city food
prices over time. Due to the limited sample size, the xed e¤ects specication did not permit meaningful
precision.
21In an unreported regression we included separate variables for the prices of fruits/vegetables, meats, and
other (unhealthy) foods, along with interactions of these three food prices with discount factor. The coe¢ cient
estimates for price and the interaction of price and discount factor were both much larger for "other" foods
than for fruits/vegetables and meats, suggesting that consumersBMIs and the BMIs of impatient consumers
in particular are most responsive to the prices of unhealthy foods. However, multicollinearity among the
price variables prevented any of the price variables or interaction terms from being statistically signicant.
We therefore consider these ndings speculative and do not present them in the paper.
22The ACCRA COLI cities vary somewhat from quarter to quarter. For cities that do not have second
quarter prices in 2007 or 2008 available, we use the rst quarter. If the rst quarter is also not available, we
use the third quarter, then the fourth quarter. If no price information is available for a city from any of the
four quarters, all observations matched to that city are dropped. The sample size is therefore slightly smaller
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current food prices, the BMIs of a citys residents likely inuence the market price of food
rather than the other way around. The sixth column of Table 9 controls for state xed
e¤ects as well as a dummy variable for whether the respondent lives in an urban area, while
the seventh column also adds interactions of the state xed e¤ects and urban dummy with
discount factor. These regressions address potential omitted variable bias from unobserved
geographic variables correlated with both local food prices or the interaction of food prices
with discount factor and population weight. Finally, the last column of Table 9 controls for
interactions of food prices with all the other covariates in the model, addressing the possible
concern that estimated heterogeneity by time preference might actually reect heterogeneity
by characteristics that are correlated with time preference, such as income and education.
Consistent with results from the literature (e.g. Chou et al., 2004), the coe¢ cient estimate
for food price is negative across all 16 specications in Tables 8 and 9 and signicant at the
10% level or better in 12 of the 16. The interaction term is positively associated with BMI
in all regressions and signicant at the 10% level or better in 15 of the 16. These results
support the prediction that more patient people respond less strongly than impatient people
to changes in food prices. The coe¢ cient estimates for the interaction term are all within
each others condence intervals, ranging from 1.40 to 4.02. Aside from the regression that
computes discount factor exclusively from the monthly delay question (column (7) of Table 8),
the estimates are all within the narrower range of 2.61 to 4.02 and signicant. Additionally,
future food prices are not statistically associated with BMI (third through fth columns of
Table 9), so there is no evidence of reverse causality.23
Figure 2 uses the estimates from the full model in column (6) of Table 8 to show how the
marginal e¤ect of food price on BMI changes across the discount factor distribution. The
solid line shows the marginal e¤ect, while the dashed lines represent the endpoints of the 95%
condence interval. A $1 increase in food price (30% of the sample mean) decreases the BMIs
in the regressions that control for future food prices.
23In unreported regressions, we repeated the falsication exercises with height and the other health condi-
tions as the dependent variables and the full set of controls. Neither discount factor nor its interaction with
food prices was ever statistically signicant.
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of the most impatient individuals by almost 2 units, or 13 pounds at the sample mean height.
This is a decrease of 7% of the sample mean BMI, implying a food price elasticity of BMI of
-0.23. The e¤ect of food prices on BMI steadily weakens with additional patience, reaching
zero at a discount factor of 0.66. Though the sign ips to positive after that point, at no
point in the distribution is the marginal e¤ect positive and signicant.
Figures 3-5 illustrate how this heterogeneity in the food price e¤ect can a¤ect the variance
of the BMI distribution. We perform an approximate median split and dene "impatient"
individuals as those with discount factors below 0.5 and "patient" individuals as those with
discount factors above 0.5. We use the regression results from the full model in column (6)
of Table 8 to plot the predicted BMI distributions for the two groups at the sample mean
food price of $3.34, as well as at $0.40 above and below the mean. We choose $0.40 above
and below the mean because, according to Consumer Price Index (CPI) data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, the real price of food at home fell by 12% during the 50 years preceding
the survey year 2006, and 12% of our sample mean food price is $0.40.24 Figure 3 therefore
represents the predicted BMI distributions of patient and impatient individuals at 1956 food
prices, Figure 4 shows the distributions at 2006 prices, and Figure 5 presents the distributions
if the price of the food basket falls by another $0.40 in the future. Figure 3 shows that at
1956 food prices the predicted BMI distributions of impatient and patient people are virtually
on top of each other. As food prices fall to 2006 levels in Figure 4, a di¤erence between the
two distributions emerges and impatient individuals have higher predicted BMIs than patient
individuals. Figure 5 projects that if real food prices fall further in the future the gap between
the two groups will widen even more.
4.3 Time-Inconsistent Discounting and BMI
We close the empirical analysis by providing a preliminary attempt to determine the degree to
which the observed relationship between time preference and BMI reects rational intertem-
24After adjusting for changes in the overall CPI, the CPI for food at home dropped from 219.4 to 193.1
between 1956 and 2006, a decline of 12%.
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poral substitution as opposed to self-control problems. As described in Section 3, the 2006
NLSY contains two intertemporal discounting questions, one over a monthly interval and the
other over an annual interval, allowing us to t the  (present-bias) and  (long-run patience)
parameters of a quasi-hyperbolic specication. The three-period theoretical model predicted
that both  and  should inuence BMI. We test these predictions by replacing the univari-
ate measure of discounting from our previous regressions with both  and . The main BMI
regression takes the form
BMIi = 0+1i+2i+3DEMOi+4HCi+5LABORi+6FINi+7RISKi+i (18)
while the specication adding prices and the interactions of food prices with  and  is
BMIi = 0 + 1i + 2i + 3DEMOi + 4HCi + 5LABORi + 6FINi + (19)
7RISKi + 8PFOODc + 9(i  PFOODc) + 10(i  PFOODc)
+11PNFc + i:
To conserve space, we only report the results from the full-sample regressions with all the
control variables, along with those from the regressions for the gender and race subsamples.
We have, however, re-estimated all the robustness checks and falsication tests from Tables
4-9 replacing discount factor with  and  and veried that our ndings are not sensitive to
specication. These results are available upon request.
The full-sample results in the rst column of Table 10 show that both present-bias  and
long-run patience  are statistically signicant and negatively associated with BMI. Present
bias and long-run impatience therefore both separately inuence weight. The magnitudes
imply that a one standard deviation increase in  (decrease in present bias) reduces BMI by
0.18 units, or 1.2 pounds at the sample mean height, while a standard deviation increase in
 (time-consistent patience) reduces weight by 0.17 BMI units or 1.1 pounds. The second
and third columns reveal that the coe¢ cient on  is negative and statistically signicant for
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women but  is not signicant, whereas the reverse pattern holds for men. This suggests
that the relationship between intertemporal preferences and BMI is driven by present bias
for females, but time-consistent impatience for males. Stratifying by race shows that both
 and  predict the BMI of whites, but there is no evidence that either inuence the weight
of non-whites. Finally, the last column shows that the interaction of  and food prices is
positive and statistically signicant, while the interaction of  and food prices is also positive
but marginally insignicant. The evidence that time-inconsistent individuals respond more
strongly to food prices is therefore clearer than the evidence regarding the interaction of
time-consistent impatience and food prices.
5 Conclusion
This study investigates the connection between time preferences, economic incentives, and
BMI. Our theoretical model predicts that greater impatience increases BMI and might
strengthen individualsresponses to food prices. We test these predictions using the 2006
NLSY matched with local price data from C2ER. Impatience is associated with BMI and the
probabilities of being overweight and obese across a wide range of specications. Interacting
the discount factor with food prices reveals that impatient individuals weigh more in counties
with lower food prices. Finally, we consider time-inconsistent quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Both present bias () and the long-run discount factor () are negatively correlated with BMI,
and their interactions with food prices are positively correlated with BMI, though only the
interaction with  is statistically signicant.
Our study aims to combine two strands of the literature on the economic causes of obesity
in an e¤ort to explain why the BMI distribution has not only shifted to the right but also
thickened in the right tail. The majority of the literature focuses on the inuence of economic
factors such as food prices on weight. While society-wide changes in economic incentives can
explain the shift to the right in the BMI distribution, they alone cannot explain why individuals
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in the right tail of the distribution have experienced the largest weight gains while others in the
left tail have not gained any weight. Another portion of the literature links time preference
to BMI, but has left unclear whether this link can help to explain the rise in obesity since
the best available evidence suggests time preferences are reasonably stable. We propose that
incentives and impatience interact to explain the changes in the BMI distribution in recent
decades. As economic factors lower the opportunity cost of food consumption, impatient
individuals gain weight while the most patient individuals do not. Mean BMI therefore rises
but the rise is concentrated among a subset of the population. We provide a preliminary
test of this theory in the context of food prices. Future research should examine whether the
interaction of time preference with other economic incentives, such as those that a¤ect the
opportunity cost of physical activity rather than eating, also predict BMI.
The theory of rational addiction makes a similar prediction: addicts who are more patient
are less responsive to current prices (Becker et. al. 1991). Townsend (1987) and Chaloupka
(1991) test this prediction with data on cigarette consumption, but with proxies for patience
(class and education, respectively). Though not in the context of a model of rational addiction,
our tests using the interaction of food prices and individual time preferences are the rst such
tests of this prediction utilizing a direct measure of patience rather than indirect proxies.
Our paper also provides the rst attempt to explicitly model quasi-hyperbolic discounting
parameters  and  and test their separate inuences on BMI and obesity. The results suggest
that the intertemporal trade-o¤s that determine body weight are at least partly due to time-
inconsistent discounting, which has potential policy implications. The standard rationale for
policies aimed at curbing obesity comes from externalities associated with obesity, such as
medical expenditures paid by the government or other members of a private insurance pool.
However, Bhattacharya and Sood (2011) argue that there are no externalities from obesity,
i.e. that the costs of obesity are paid for by the obese person himself or herself through either
out-of-pocket medical costs or foregone wages. Time inconsistency could provide a di¤erent
rationale for interventions that move more of the costs of overeating into the present period,
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such as taxes on unhealthy foods. Such a conclusion depends on how we ought to conduct
welfare analysis under time-inconsistent preferences. One argument is that we should treat
the present bias as a "mistake" or a type of market/behavioral failure, and the social planner
should maximize using a welfare function that does not include . This is the approach taken
by Heutel (2011), ODonoghue and Rabin (2006) and Gruber and Koszegi (2001). Others,
e.g. Bernheim and Rangel (2009), propose a di¤erent set of welfare criteria and do not nd
that present bias justies policy intervention in all cases.
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Table 1 ACCRA COLI Food Items (2006)
Item Average Price Weight
24 oz. white bread 1.175 0.0861
18 oz. box of corn akes; Kelloggs or Post 2.987 0.0399
Head of iceberg lettuce 1.219 0.0267
1 lb. bananas 0.518 0.0555
10 lb. sack potatoes 3.753 0.0264
15 oz. can sweet peas; Del Monte or Green Giant 0.826 0.0110
29 oz. halves or slices peaches; Hunts, Del Monte, or Libbys 1.805 0.0127
16 oz. whole kernel frozen corn 1.240 0.0110
1 lb. t-bone steak 8.383 0.0354
1 lb. ground beef 2.539 0.0354
1 lb. whole uncut chicken 1.057 0.0440
1 lb. package sausage; Jimmy Dean or Owen 3.183 0.0454
Dozen large eggs; grade A or AA 1.150 0.0100
6 oz. chunk of light tuna; Starkist or Chicken of the Sea 0.746 0.0378
8 to 10 oz. frozen chicken entree; Healthy Choice or Lean Cuisine 2.538 0.0876
12 oz. plain regular potato chips 2.419 0.0730
1/4 lb. patty with cheese; McDonalds 2.549 0.1133
11" to 12" thin crust cheese pizza; Pizza Hut or Pizza Inn 10.250 0.1133
Thigh and drumstick of chicken; Kentucky Fried Chicken or Churchs 2.863 0.1133
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Table 2 Summary Statistics for Body Weight and Time Preference Variables
Variable Name Description Mean
(Std. Dev.)
BMI Body mass index (kg/m2) 28:26
(5:76)
Overweight Binary variable equal to 1 if 25BMI<30 0:38
(0:48)
Obese (class I) 1 if 30BMI<35 0:20
(0:40)
Severely obese 1 if BMI35 0:12
(0:32)
Beta Computed using the quasi-hyperbolic discounting specication 0:80
(0:20)
Delta Computed using the quasi-hyperbolic discounting specication 0:75
(0:33)
Discount factor 1 Computed from amount needed to wait a year to receive $1000 0:59
(0:25)
Discount factor 2 Computed from amount needed to wait a month to receive $1000 0:28
(0:34)
Note: Observations are weighted using the NLSY sampling weights. All variables are from the 2006
survey unless otherwise indicated.
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Table 3 Summary Statistics for Other Variables
Variable Name Description Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Age Age in years 44:87
(2:230)
Female 1 if female 0:48
(0:50)
Race: black 1 if race is black 0:13
(0:34)
Race: other 1 if race is neither black nor white 0:03
(0:16)
Married 1 if married 0:64
(0:48)
AFQT Percentile score on armed forces qualifying test in 1985 48:97
(28:54)
High school 1 if highest grade completed=12 0:41
(0:49)
Some college 1 if 13highest grade completed15 0:24
(0:42)
College 1 if highest grade completed=16 0:28
(0:45)
White collar 1 if current occupation is white collar 0:52
(0:50)
Blue collar 1 if current occupation is blue collar 0:20
(0:40)
Service 1 if current occupation is service 0:09
(0:28)
Hours worked Average hours worked per week in the preceding year 35:92
(19:40)
Income Total household income (units of $10,000) 8:31
(8:41)
Net worth Household assets minus liabilities in 2004 (units of $10,000) 25:09
(47:57)
Risk Amount (in $1,000s) needed to forego a 50% chance of $10,000 or $0 4:79
(3:27)
Arthritis 1 if ever had arthritis or rheumatism 0:12
(0:32)
Asthma 1 if asthmatic 0:07
(0:25)
Kidney/bladder 1 if kidney or bladder problems 0:05
(0:21)
Stomach 1 if trouble with stomach, liver, intestines, or gall bladder 0:10
(0:30)
Anemia 1 if anemic 0:04
(0:21)
Colds 1 if frequent colds, sinus problems, hay fever, or allergies 0:26
(0:44)
Headaches 1 if frequent or severe headaches, dizziness, or fainting spells 0:11
(0:31)
Food price Weighted average price of 19 food items 3:34
(0:29)
Non-food index Weighted average price index of non-food price categories 105:43
(17:82)
See notes for Table 2.
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Table 4 Discount Factor and BMI
Dependent Variable: BMI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Discount factor  1:44
(0:35)
 1:30
(0:35)
 1:08
(0:35)
 1:07
(0:35)
 0:92
(0:35)
 0:98
(0:35)
 0:84
(0:26)
 1:16
(0:34)
Age   0:04
(0:04)
0:04
(0:04)
0:04
(0:04)
0:04
(0:04)
0:05
(0:04)
0:05
(0:04)
0:05
(0:04)
Female    0:73
(0:17)
 0:71
(0:17)
 0:54
(0:19)
 0:57
(0:19)
 0:57
(0:19)
 0:55
(0:19)
 0:56
(0:19)
Race: black   2:15
(0:19)
1:99
(0:22)
2:01
(0:22)
1:95
(0:22)
1:96
(0:22)
1:95
(0:22)
1:94
(0:22)
Race: other   0:61
(0:44)
0:50
(0:44)
0:50
(0:45)
0:53
(0:44)
0:54
(0:44)
0:51
(0:44)
0:52
(0:44)
Married   0:06
(0:19)
0:18
(0:19)
0:16
(0:19)
0:73
(0:22)
0:73
(0:22)
0:73
(0:22)
0:73
(0:22)
AFQT      0:001
(0:004)
 0:004
(0:004)
0:001
(0:004)
0:001
(0:004)
0:001
(0:004)
0:002
(0:004)
High school     0:20
(0:38)
0:04
(0:38)
0:10
(0:38)
0:11
(0:38)
0:09
(0:38)
0:10
(0:38)
Some college      0:07
(0:42)
 0:29
(0:42)
 0:13
(0:42)
 0:12
(0:41)
 0:13
(0:41)
 0:12
(0:41)
College      1:10
(0:44)
 1:38
(0:44)
 0:88
(0:45)
 0:87
(0:45)
 0:89
(0:45)
 0:88
(0:45)
White collar       0:03
(0:28)
 0:02
(0:28)
 0:02
(0:28)
 0:02
(0:28)
 0:03
(0:28)
Blue collar        0:32
(0:31)
 0:44
(0:32)
 0:44
(0:32)
 0:42
(0:32)
 0:43
(0:32)
Service        0:37
(0:35)
 0:59
(0:35)
 0:60
(0:35)
 0:61
(0:35)
 0:60
(0:35)
Work hours       0:02
(0:01)
0:03
(0:01)
0:03
(0:01)
0:03
(0:01)
0:03
(0:01)
Income          0:13
(0:03)
 0:13
(0:03)
 0:13
(0:03)
 0:13
(0:03)
Income2         0:001
(0:001)
0:001
(0:001)
0:002
(0:001)
0:001
(0:001)
Net worth          0:006
(0:002)
 0:006
(0:002)
 0:006
(0:002)
 0:006
(0:002)
Risk            0:027
(0:025)
 0:027
(0:025)
 0:030
(0:025)
D. factor measure DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1 DF2 DF
Notes: n = 5982. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically
signicant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the NLSY
sampling weights.
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Table 5 Heterogeneity by Gender and Race
Dependent Variable: BMI
Gender Race
Women Men White Non-White
Discount factor  0:70
(0:50)
 1:31
(0:49)
 1:12
(0:41)
 0:21
(0:55)
Demographics YES YES YES YES
Human capital YES YES YES YES
Labor YES YES YES YES
Financial YES YES YES YES
Risk YES YES YES YES
Discount factor measure DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1
Observations 2989 2993 3894 2088
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically
signicant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. Observations are weighted using
the NLSY sampling weights. "Demographic" controls include age, gender, race,
and marital status. "Human capital" controls include AFQT score and the
education dummies. "Labor" controls include work hours and white collar, blue
collar, and service indicators. "Financial" controls include income, income2 and net worth.
Table 6 Ordered Probit Results
Dependent Variable: BMI Category
Variable Coe¢ cient Marginal E¤ects
Estimate Overweight Obese
(Class 1)
Severely
Obese
Discount factor  0:17
(0:07)
0:0006
(0:001)
 0:027
(0:011)
 0:033
(0:013)
Demographics YES YES YES YES
Human capital YES YES YES YES
Labor YES YES YES YES
Financial YES YES YES YES
Risk YES YES YES YES
Discount factor measure DF1 DF1 DF1 DF1
Notes: n = 5982. See other notes for Table 5.
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Table 10 Time Inconsistency and BMI
Dependent Variable: BMI
Full Sample Women Men White Non-White Interactions
Beta  0:92
(0:46)
 1:24
(0:61)
 0:54
(0:67)
 1:11
(0:53)
0:26
(0:72)
 13:80
(5:35)
Delta  0:50
(0:25)
 0:25
(0:37)
 0:81
(0:35)
 0:57
(0:32)
 0:25
(0:35)
 5:20
(3:13)
Food price            4:27
(1:63)
Non-food index           0:006
(0:008)
Beta*food price           3:78
(1:58)
Delta*food price           1:43
(0:94)
Demographics YES YES YES YES YES YES
Human capital YES YES YES YES YES YES
Financial YES YES YES YES YES YES
Risk YES YES YES YES YES YES
Food price measure           1
Observations 5982 2989 2993 3894 2088 5090
See notes for Table 5.
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Figure 1 Change in BMI Distribution from 1971-1975 to 2003-2008
The 1971-1975 distribution is estimated using the National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES) I, while the 2003-2008 distribution is estimated by pooling the 2003-2004, 2005-
2006, and 2007-2008 NHANES. Between 1971-1975 and 2003-2008, the mean of the BMI distribution
rose from 23.0 to 25.3 while the standard deviation increased from 5.9 to 7.4.
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Figure 2 Marginal E¤ect of Food Price on BMI Across Discount Factor
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Figure 3 BMI Distributions by Degree of Patience at Estimated 1956 Food
Price=$3.74
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Figure 4 BMI Distributions by Degree of Patience at 2006 Food Price=$3.34
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Figure 5 BMI Distributions by Degree of Patience at Estimated Food
Price=$2.94
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